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Twisted Gabidulin Codes in the GPT Cryptosystem
Sven Puchinger, Julian Renner, Antonia Wachter-Zeh
Abstract— In this paper, we investigate twisted Gabidulin
codes in the GPT code-based public-key cryptosystem. We show
that Overbeck’s attack is not feasible for a subfamily of twisted
Gabidulin codes. The resulting key sizes are significantly lower
than in the original McEliece system and also slightly smaller
than in Loidreau’s unbroken GPT variant.
I . I N T R O D U C T I O N
A rank-metric code is a set of matrices whose distances
are measured by the rank of their difference. These codes,
as well as their most famous family, Gabidulin codes, were
independently introduced in [1]–[3]. Gabidulin codes are
maximum rank distance (MRD) codes, i.e., they fulfill the
rank-metric Singleton bound with equality.
Twisted Gabidulin codes were introduced by Sheekey in [4],
and are defined by adding an extra monomial to the evaluation
polynomials of a Gabidulin code and choosing its coefficient in
a suitable way such that the new codes remain MRD. A special
case of Sheekey’s twisted Gabidulin codes was independently
introduced in [5]. The idea of twisted Gabidulin codes was
adapted to the Hamming metric and generalized in [6], [7],
resulting in so-called twisted Reed–Solomon (RS) codes. The
methods developed for the latter codes were used to widely
generalize Sheekey’s construction in [8].
The Gabidulin–Paramonov–Tretjakov (GPT) cryptosys-
tem [9] is a modification of the McEliece code-based public-
key cryptosystem using rank-metric codes. Its motivation arises
from the fact that all known generic rank-metric decoders
[10]–[13] are exponential in the square of the code parameters,
which, compared to codes in Hamming metric, results in much
smaller key sizes for a given security level (in cases where
generic decoding is the most efficient attack). The original
GPT system was modified several times [14]–[20] due to
efficient attacks by Gibson [21], [22] and Overbeck [23]–[25].
However, most of these systems were broken by variants of
Overbeck’s attack, cf. [26]–[28]. The only variants that have
not been broken so far are the one by Loidreau [29], [30] and
the one by Berger et al. [31].
Recently, it was shown that a subfamily of twisted RS
codes resists several known structural attacks on the McEliece
cryptosystem based on RS-like codes [7]. In this paper, we
establish an analogous result in the rank metric. We prove
that certain twisted Gabidulin codes resist Overbeck’s attack
which provides key sizes that are smaller than comparable
code-based systems for the same security levels.
I I . P R E L I M I N A R I E S
Let Fqm and Fq be finite fields, where Fqm is an extension
field of Fq . It is well-known that Fqm is also an m-dimensional
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vector space over Fq and that elements of Fqm can be uniquely
represented in a fixed basis of Fqm over Fq. Hence, we can
represent a vector c ∈ Fnqm of length n as an m× n matrix
C ∈ Fm×nq by expanding the entries of c column-wise. The
rank rank(c) of a vector c ∈ Fqm is defined by the rank of
its matrix representation.
A. Rank-Metric Codes
The rank metric is defined by
dR : Fqm × Fqm → N0, (x,y) 7→ rank(x− y).
It can be shown that the rank metric is indeed a metric. A
linear rank-metric code of length n, dimension k and minimum
(rank) distance d over Fqm , denoted by C or C[n, k], is a k-
dimensional subspace of Fnqm , which fulfills
d = min
c1,c2∈C
c1 6=c2
dR(c1, c2).
The rank-metric Singleton bound states that the minimum
distance of such a code with n ≤ m is upper-bounded by
d ≤ n−k+1. If a code fulfills this upper bound with equality,
then it is called maximum rank distance (MRD) code.
B. Linearized Polynomials
Linearized polynomials were first studied in [32]. They are
polynomials of the form f =
∑
i fix
qi , where fi ∈ Fqm and
fi 6= 0 for finitely many i. For notational convenience, we
define [i] := qi, so we write f =
∑
i fix
[i]. The q-degree of
f is defined by
degq f :=
{
max{i : fi 6= 0}, if f 6= 0,
−∞, if f = 0.
The evaluation map f(·) : Fqm → Fqm , α 7→
∑
i fiα
qi
is Fq-linear. Using ordinary addition and composition of
polynomials as multiplication, linearized polynomials form
a (non-commutative) ring, which we denote by Lqm .
C. Gabidulin Codes
Gabidulin codes are MRD codes that were independently
introduced in [1]–[3]. They are defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Gabidulin code [1]–[3]) Let α1, . . . , αn ∈
Fqm be linearly independent over Fq and k < n. The
corresponding [n, k] Gabidulin code is defined by
CGab =
{[
f(α1), f(α2), . . . , f(αn)
]
: f ∈ Lqm , degq f < k
}
.
D. Sum Operator
Definition 2 (q-Sum) Let C[n, k] be a linear code over Fqm
and i ∈ N0. Then, the (ith) q-sum of C is defined by
Λi(C) = C + C[1] + · · ·+ C[i].
It is well-known that a random code fulfills
dim Λi(C) = min{n, ik}
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with high probability and that a Gabidulin code satisfies
dim Λi(C) = min{n, k + i}.
Hence, for k < n − i, a Gabidulin code has smaller q-sum
dimension than a random code with high probability. This
observation was used in [24], [25] to obtain a distinguisher
and an attack on the GPT cryptosystem.
We will also use the q-sum operator for matrices.
Definition 3 (q-Sum) Let A ∈ Fs×nq and i ∈ N0. Then, the
(ith) q-sum of A is defined by
Λi(A) =

A
A[1]
...
A[i]

If G is a generator matrix of a code C, then Λi(G) is a
generator matrix of Λi(C).
I I I . VA R I A N T S O F T H E G P T C RY P T O S Y S T E M A N D
OV E R B E C K ’ S AT TA C K
A. The GPT Crpytosystem and Its Variants
The GPT cryptosystem is an instantiation of the McEliece
cryptosystem with Gabidulin codes. In this paper, we study
the most general form of the GPT cryptosystem, cf. [33].
Key Generation: Let G be the k × n generator matrix of
an [n, k] Gabidulin code, S a random full-rank k × k matrix
over Fqm , X a random matrix of size k×λ over Fqm of rank
1 ≤ s ≤ λ and P a random (n+λ)×(n+λ) full-rank matrix
over Fq. Then, the public key of the GPT cryptosystem is
defined as:
Gpub = S[X|G]P (1)
and the integers n, λ, k, t =
⌊
n−k
2
⌋
.
To ensure proper decoding, it is important that P lies in Fq .
However, this enables Overbeck’s attack (see the following
subsection). In [17], [19], variants for P were suggested where
P is in Fqm . However, as shown in [27], in all of these variants,
the public key can be rewritten as
Gpub = S
∗[X∗|G∗]P ∗,
where P ∗ is in Fq .
Encryption: To encode a plaintext m, choose randomly a
vector z ∈ Fnqm of rank t and compute the ciphertext as
c = mGpub + z.
Decryption: Apply the decoding algorithm corresponding
to G to the last n symbols of cP−1. Clearly rank(zP−1) ≤ t.
This decoder therefore provides mS and by inverting S, the
secret message m can be recovered.
B. Overbeck’s Attack
Overbeck’s attack [24], [25] is based on two observations:
i) An [n, k] Gabidulin code has a parity-check matrix of
the form
H=

γ
γ[1]
...
γ[n−k−1]
:=

γ1 γ2 . . . γn
γ
[1]
1 γ
[1]
2 . . . γ
[1]
n
...
...
. . .
...
γ
[n−k−1]
1 γ
[n−k−1]
2 . . . γ
[n−k−1]
n
,
where γ ∈ Fnqm with linearly independent entries.
ii) There is an integer i such that
dim Λi(C) = n− 1.
The idea is to recover a vector γ by choosing a non-zero
vector in the dual code of Λi(C).
In the following, we show that property (ii) is fulfilled for
the most general form of the GPT system, the one with a
public key as in (1).
The generator matrix of the code Λi(Cpub) is:
Λi(Gpub) =

Gpub
G
[1]
pub
...
G
[i]
pub
 = S′ ·

X|G
X [1]|G[1]
...
X [i]|G[i]
 · P ,
where P [i] = P since P ∈ F`+nq and S′ is a block diagonal
matrix with S,S[1], . . . ,S[i] on the diagonal.
Since
rank

X
X [1]
...
X [i]
 ≤ min{λ, i}, and rank

G
G[1]
...
G[i]
 = k + i,
we have dim Λi(Cpub) ≤ min{n, k+i+t}. For i = n−k−t−
1, we get that rank Λi(Gpub) = n−1 and there exists a vector
v = (0|v′) such that Λi(Gpub)·vT = 0 and Overbeck’s attack
can be applied by simply using a polynomial-time decoder on
the public code.
I V. T W I S T E D G A B I D U L I N C O D E S
A. Definition
Definition 4 (Twisted Gabidulin Code, [8]) Let n, k, ` ∈
N with k < n and ` ≤ n− k. Choose a
• hook vector1 h ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}` and a
• twist vector t ∈ {1, . . . , n− k}` with distinct ti, and let
• η ∈ (Fqm \ {0})`.
The set of [k, t,h,η]-twisted linearized polynomials over Fqm
is defined by
Pn,kt,h,η =
f =
k−1∑
i=0
fix
[i] +
∑`
j=1
ηjfhjx
[k−1+tj ] : fi ∈ Fqm
 .
Let α1, . . . , αn ∈ Fqm be linearly independent over Fq and
write α = [α1, . . . , αn]. The [α, t,h,η]-twisted Gabidulin
code of length n and dimension k is given by
Cα,t,h,η[n, k] =
{[
f(α1), f(α2), . . . , f(αn)] : f ∈ Pn,kt,h,η
}
.
B. Generator Matrix of a Twisted Gabiulin Code
A generator matrix of a twisted Gabidulin code with h1 <
h2 < · · · < h` is given by:
1For didactic reasons, this definition slightly differs from the one in [8],
i.e., is a special case.
GTGab =

α
α[1]
...
α[h1−1]
α[h1] + η1α
[k−1+t1]
α[h1+1]
...
α[h`−1]
α[h`] + η`α
[k−1+t`]
α[h`+1]
...
α[k−1]

.
Example 1 The following matrix is a example for the genera-
tor matrix of an [n, k] = [27, 10] twisted Gabidulin code with
t = [6, 12], h = [5, 6], see also the illustration in Figure 1:
GTGab =

α
α[1]
α[2]
α[3]
α[4]
α[5] + η1α
[15]
α[6] + η2α
[21]
α[7]
α[8]
α[9]

Fig. 1. Illustration of the generator matrix in Example 1.
C. MRD Twisted Gabidulin Codes
It was shown in [8] that if the ηj and the evaluation points
αi are chosen in a proper way, the twisted Gabidulin code
Cα,t,h,η[n, k] is MRD.
Theorem 2 (Twisted Gabidulin are MRD, [8, Thm 1])
Let s0, . . . , s` ∈ N be such that
Fq ⊆ Fqs0 ( Fqs1 ( · · · ( Fqs` = Fqm
is a chain of subfields. Choose k < n ≤ s0 and h, t,η,α as
in Definition 4 with the additional requirements
α1, . . . , αn ∈ Fqs0 , and
ηi ∈ Fqsi \ Fqsi−1 ∀ i = 1, . . . , `.
Then, Cα,t,h,η[n, k] is MRD.
Remark 3 We can choose si = 2 · si−1 in Theorem 2. In this
way, we obtain
m = 2`s0 ≥ 2`n.
This means that when n = s0, the memory required to store
a generator matrix of a twisted Gabidulin code with ` twists
is 2` times larger than the one of a Gabidulin code with the
same parameters [n, k].
D. Decoding
Finding an efficient decoding algorithm for twisted
Gabidulin codes is an open problem and research in progress.
For the original twisted Gabidulin codes by Sheekey [4], an
efficient decoding algorithm was found in [34], [35]. Although
a generalization to the twisted codes in [8] does not appear
to be straightforward, it seems likely that an efficient decoder
will be found soon.
V. T W I S T E D G A B I D U L I N C O D E S W I T H L A R G E
q - S U M D I M E N S I O N
In this section, we show that twisted Gabidulin codes can
have larger q-sum dimension than a Gabidulin code of the
same dimension would have.
Theorem 4 (Large q-Sum Dimension) Let n, k, t,h,η,α
be chosen as in Definition 4 such that
∆ := n−k−``+1 ∈ N, (2)
ti := (i+ 1)(∆ + 1), ∀ i = 1, . . . , `, (3)
0 < h1 < h2 < . . . h` < k − 1 s.t.
|hi+1 − hi| > 1, ∀ i = 1, . . . , `− 1. (4)
For all i ∈ N, we then have
dim Λi(Cα,t,h,η[n, k]) = min{k − 1 + (i+ 1)(`+ 1), n}.
Proof: Let C := Cα,t,h,η[n, k]. We first prove that
GΛ1(C) :=

α[0]
α[1]
...
α[k]
α[k−1+t1]
α[k+t1]
α[k−1+t2]
α[k+t2]
...
α[k−1+t`]
α[k+t`]

is a generator matrix of the code Λ1(C). The proof is illustrated
in Figure 2.
+
=
Fig. 2. Illustration of the first part of Theorem 4’s proof.
By Condition (4), for any i = 1, . . . , `, the vectors αhi−1
and αhi+1 are in C, so
(αhi−1)[1] = αhi , (αhi+1)[1] = αhi+2
are in C[1]. Hence, for any αj with j = 0, . . . , k, αj is in the
code C (if we have j 6= hi for all i) or in C[1] (if, e.g., j = hi
for some i).
Any α[k−1+ti] is in Λ1(C) since
α[k−1+ti] = η−1i
(
ηiα
[k−1+ti] +α[hi]︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈C
)− η−1i α[hi]︸︷︷︸
∈Λ1(C)
,
and similarly, we have
α[k+ti] =
(
η−1i
)[−1](
ηiα
[k−1+ti] +α[hi]
)[1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈C[1]
−(η−1i )[−1] α[hi]︸︷︷︸
∈Λ1(C)
.
Since the α[i] are linearly independent for 0 ≤ i < n
and there are no other possible powers of α achievable by
linear combinations of elements in C and C[1], the rows of the
generator matrix GΛ1(C) are a basis of Λ1(C). As the matrix
has k + 1 + 2` = k − 1 + 2(`+ 1) rows.
By the choice of the ti, the “power gaps” between α[k]
and α[k−1+t1], as well as between α[k+ti] and α[k−1+ti+1]
for any i = 1, . . . , `− 1, and between α[k+t`] and α[n], are
exactly ∆− 1.
If we iteratively increase the q-power of Λi(C) to Λi+1(C),
the new basis elements are
α[k+i], α[k+t1+i], α[k+t2+i], . . . , α[k+t`+i],
which are `+ 1 many. This process can be repeated until we
have i = ∆, in which case the code Λi(C) already contains
all α[0],α[1], . . . ,α[n−1] and has dimension n.
This implies the claim. The iteration is illustrated in Figure 3.
i = 1:
+
=
...i = 4 = ∆− 1:
+
=
Fig. 3. Illustration of the inductive argument in the second half of Theorem 4’s
proof.
V I . OV E R B E C K ’ S AT TA C K O N T W I S T E D
G A B I D U L I N C O D E S
We consider the code family in Theorem 4 and show that
it is resistant against Overbeck’s attack by considering its two
underlying key ideas (Properties i) and i) in Section III-B).
A. Property i)
Theorem 5 Let C be a code defined as in Theorem 4 and let
Ci := Λi(C) be its ith q-sum. If Ci 6= Fnqm , then Ci does not
have a generator matrix of the form
γ
γ[1]
...
γ[j−1]
 ,
where γ ∈ Fnqm with linearly independent entries and j ≤ n.
Proof: The q-sums of the codes C in Theorem 4 increase
by `+ 1 when increasing i. If any of the q-sums Ci := Λi(C)
had a parity check matrix of the above form, then, by the same
arguments as in [2], Ci would have a generator matrix of the
form [β>,β[1]
>
, . . . ,β[n−j−1]
>
]> for some β ∈ Fnqm with
linearly independent entries. This would, however, imply that
the first q-sum Λ1(Ci) of Ci would have dimension
dim Λ1(Ci) = dim Ci+1 = dim Ci + 1,
contradicting the fact that the q-sum increases by `+ 1.
B. Property ii)
Theorem 6 Let C be a code defined as in Theorem 4 and let
Ci := Λi(C) be its ith q-sum. Then, we have Ci = Fnqm or
dim Ci ≤ n− (`+ 1).
Proof: This statement follows directly from the dimen-
sion of Ci, which is given in Theorem 4.
C. An Exponential-Time Attack
By construction, any q-sum (that is not equal to Fnqm ) of a
code C as in Theorem 4 is a subset of a large Gabidulin code
D, which is defined as follows:
Ci := Λi(C) ⊆ 〈α,α[1], . . . ,α[n−2]〉 =: D.
Since any non-zero vector γ in the dual code of D gives a
parity check matrix from which the evaluation points α can
be recovered, such an γ can be found by first determining the
q-sum Ci of C of dimension n− (`+ 1) and then searching
its dual code C⊥i . Due to |C⊥i | = (qm)`+1, such an attack has
work factor
WExp−Att =
(qm)`+1
qm − 1 ≈ q
m`. (5)
Hence, we must choose m and ` large enough in order to
prevent this attack to be efficient.
V I I . E X A M P L E PA R A M E T E R S
In this Section, the security level, the rate and the keysize
of the GPT cryptosystem based on twisted Gabidulin codes
is compared with McEliece’s cryptosystem based on Goppa
codes using list decoding [36], Loidreau’s new rank-metric
code-based encryption scheme [29], [30] and the QC-MDPC
cryptosystem [37].
The considered attacks on the new GPT variant based on
twisted Gabidulin codes are the syndrome decoding attacks in
[11], [13], Gibson’s attack [21], [22], and the exponential-time
attack described in Section VI-C, cf. (5).
Table I gives parameters for expected work factors of around
280, 2130 and 2260. The security level of the GPT system
which is based on twisted Gabidulin codes is determined by
the smallest work factor which is given by the decoding attack
in [11] for all three cases. We observe that for all work factors
McEliece has the highest rate followed by Loidreau, Twisted
GPT and QC-MDPC. The results show further that although
the keysizes of Twisted GPT and Loidreau are larger than
the keysizes of QC-MDPC, they require much smaller key
sizes compared to McEliece. Since the QC-MDPC scheme
gives no guarantee that the cipher can be decrypted, the GPT
cryptosystem based on twisted Gabidulin codes should be
considered as an alternative of McEliece, Loidreau and QC-
MDPC.
TABLE I
C O M PA R I S O N O F M C E L I E C E , L O I D R E A U , T W I S T E D G P T A N D Q C - M D P C
Method q k n m l λ s t τ tLoi λ′ Security level Rate Key size
McEliece 2 1436 1876 11 41 80.04 0.77 78.98 KB
Loidreau 2 32 50 50 3 3 80.93 0.64 3.60 KB
Twisted GPT 2 18 26 104 2 6 1 4 83.10 0.56 3.28 KB
QC-MDPC 2 4801 9602 80.00 0.50 0.60 KB
McEliece 2 2482 3262 12 66 128.02 0.76 242.00 KB
Loidreau 2 40 64 96 4 3 139.75 0.63 11.52 KB
Twisted GPT 2 21 33 132 2 8 1 6 138.89 0.51 6.93 KB
QC-MDPC 2 9857 19714 128.00 0.50 1.23 KB
McEliece 2 5318 7008 13 133 257.47 0.76 1123.43 KB
Loidreau 2 80 120 128 4 5 261.00 0.67 51.20 KB
Twisted GPT 2 32 48 192 2 12 2 8 262.75 0.53 21.50 KB
QC-MDPC 2 32771 65542 256.00 0.50 4.10 KB
V I I I . C O N C L U S I O N
We have shown that a subfamily of twisted Gabidulin resists
the Overbeck attack and could therefore be considered for the
use in the GPT cryptosystem. The resulting example key sizes
improve upon the original McEliece and the Loidreau’s rank-
metric cryptosystem.
A drawback of the codes remains that for a small number
of twists `, their q-sum dimension is rather low compared
to random codes of the same dimension (though larger than
the one of a Gabidulin code). This gives a distinguisher and
potentially results in a weakness of the system. However,
we are not aware of an explicit attack that can utilize this
distinguisher. Further research must be conducted in order to
investigate this issue.
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